The rules of engagement (or ROE) are a series of restrictive measures imposed on the coalition forces in Afghanistan. They are designed to reduce civilian casualties. For example, firing into an area where civilians might be is prohibited, regardless of the presence of Taliban. Airstrikes and artillery fire are severely restricted, even when coalition forces are in direct contact with the enemy and in desperate need of assistance. These encounters often result in coalition casualties that could have been prevented had quick, decisive action been taken. However, commanders in the field are very cautious of being accused of employing excessive fire power for fear of running afoul of the complex and confusing rules. These rules are taken very seriously by the coalition senior commanders. Violating them can result in severe punishment; observing them can get you killed. Obviously, these rules were not written by the soldiers on the battlefield. Rather, they were drafted by lawyers, politicians and diplomats far from the killing fields in southern Afghanistan where split second decisions must be made constantly just to stay alive. There, mired in the fog of war, the name of the game is survival.

The most basic rule of combat that all soldiers instinctively follow is self-defense. Since war, by its very nature, is a brutal business, the rule makes imminent good sense. Soldiers who fail to follow it do not survive long in combat. This harsh reality is the basis of the cold calculus of war-kill or be killed. There really is no other option. The slightest hesitation in the presence of the enemy will get you killed.

It is also true that this rule will often result in the death of noncombatants. This is always the case in war and must be clearly understood, and accepted, in the beginning. All good commanders know that their highest loyalty must be to their soldiers and they will never, ever subject them to unnecessary risk. As a result, noncombatants will die. They always do. As General Sherman famously remarked during the Civil War, “War is hell.”

In Afghanistan today, this ancient rule of warfare is being rewritten in an effort to produce a kinder and gentler form of combat that will not unduly offend the sensibilities of the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. The coalition forces here have decided they must conduct the war under a radically different set of rules, hence ROE. It’s all part of the new counterinsurgency strategy that puts an extremely high premium on protecting the civilian population. The strategy, still unproved, goes something like this: If we protect the civilian population and show them that we truly care about them, then they may decide to support the Karzai government and turn against the Taliban. This is often referred to as “winning the hearts and minds” of the population. If all of this battlefield social engineering miraculously works as planned, then we can leave and Afghanistan will become a strong, vibrant nation ready to take its place as a productive member of the nations of the world.

Without question, this is a noble goal. However, the strategy is seriously flawed. A successful counterinsurgency strategy must make eliminating the insurgents the primary goal, not protecting the population. If the emphasis is not on the insurgents, then it will fail. For all kinds of obvious reasons, care should be taken to keep civilian casualties as low as possible but no one seriously engages in a counterinsurgency to protect the people. Also keep in mind that not all civilians are alike. Many actively support the Taliban which means the line between combatant and non-combatant is often hopelessly blurred. Under these conditions, absolute certainty is in very short supply. The point is this: Neither killing the people nor saving the people will change the behavior of the insurgents and relying on the civilian population to somehow tip the balance in favor of the coalition forces is wishful thinking. The strategy is further undermined by the mistaken belief that the rules of engagement will cause the people to embrace the Karzai government. Unfortunately for the coalition, this is the same government many Afghans fear and view as corrupt. In most districts considered key to winning the war, there is very little support for the coalition-backed government of Hamid Karzai.

Despite enormous effort by the members of the coalition to convince the Afghan government to assume greater responsibility for prosecuting the war, it is still a coalition enterprise. At best, the Karzai regime remains ambivalent, reluctant to step up and assume a greater role. The Wall Street Journal recently wrote about American efforts “to persuade President Karzai to act more presidential by giving him more responsibility for operations inside his country.” As of this date, there is still no sense of urgency coming out of the palace, even as the July 2011 dead line for Americans to begin withdrawing approaches. It’s as if the Afghans don’t believe President Obama and think all this business about an American withdrawal is nothing but a bluff. Incredibly, there is still no national draft requiring young Afghan men to serve in either the Afghan army or the National Police. Apparently, saving Afghanistan is of greater importance to the coalition nations than it is to the Karzai regime.

Meanwhile, in southern Afghanistan, a half million acres of poppies were recently harvested. And, while it is well known that the poppies feed corruption and fund the Taliban, no serious efforts are underway to eradicate them. The coalition forces continue to prosecute the war as best they can under the current rules of engagement, the rules that reduce risks to the population while increasing the risks to themselves, desperately trying to make the new counterinsurgency strategy succeed.

Imagine explaining this strategy to General Sherman. I don’t think he’d buy it.